EU Court on residence permit delays in Poland: suspended deadlines must not remove judicial protection
Judgment C‑254/25 concerns protection against delays for study permits and other categories covered by Directive 2016/801. We explain its significance for Polish courts and its connection with case C‑797/25.
On 12 November 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union delivered an important judgment for people awaiting residence permits in Poland. The case began with a foreign student’s complaint about a voivode’s failure to act. Its conclusions also matter for other categories of applicants covered by the same EU directive.
When someone waits months for a decision, the statutory deadline is only part of the issue. It also matters whether they can seek judicial protection. This was the problem examined by the Court in C‑254/25 Wojewoda Śląski.
The Court held that, in the absence of force majeure, a state cannot suspend the deadlines laid down in Directive 2016/801 in a way that deprives applicants of effective judicial protection against inaction or delays. Even when a state invokes exceptional circumstances, a court must be able to examine whether that justification is valid. Full judgment, paragraphs 35 and 47.
Poland justified the suspension by referring to the mass arrival of people fleeing Russia’s war against Ukraine and the increased workload of administrative authorities. Invoking that situation alone is not enough. The state must demonstrate what prevented it from meeting deadlines, what measures it took and why the difficulties could not have been overcome earlier. Exceptions are permissible only for the time needed to overcome those difficulties.
This is a significant result, but its scope should be clear from the outset. The directive primarily covers:
- students;
- researchers;
- trainees who meet the directive’s conditions;
- participants in European voluntary service.
The individual case concerned a student, but the Court’s conclusion is not limited to studies. The operative part of the judgment refers to the directive’s general Article 34. Its interpretation therefore also matters for the relevant applications of the other groups listed above. The legal basis of the application is decisive: studying or working at a university does not, by itself, mean that a particular procedure falls under this directive. Articles 2 and 34 of Directive 2016/801.
This judgment provides a basis for other similar cases. The Court interpreted the general rules in Article 34 rather than creating an exception for one applicant. We now have a judgment whose interpretation Polish courts must apply in similar disputes about delays covered by that provision. Other applicants can rely on it when their complaints are heard in Poland: each person does not need to obtain a new CJEU judgment on the same legal issue. How preliminary rulings work.
The Court did not directly decide this issue for ordinary residence and work permits, EU Blue Cards, general family reunification, permanent residence or EU long-term resident status. Polish courts may use the judgment’s reasoning in cases involving other grounds for residence, including work. Since the legal bases differ, future judgments will show how successfully those arguments can be applied.
C‑254/25 may also provide arguments in other cases before the CJEU concerning delays in residence procedures. A reference concerning residence and work has already been submitted: C‑797/25 Wojewoda Dolnośląski concerns suspended deadlines for examining an application by a Ukrainian citizen under temporary protection. The reference was made by the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Wrocław and received by the CJEU on 8 December 2025. Official summary of the reference.
Temporary protection is an important feature of that case: it raises the question of protection for the applicant in light of the exclusion of this category from the directive on a single residence and work permit. It is therefore not an exact counterpart of C‑254/25. The possible use of one judgment’s reasoning in another case is our analysis, not an answer already given by the CJEU in C‑797/25.
The story began in April 2024. A foreign student applied for temporary residence to continue studying in Poland. Having received no decision, he submitted a ponaglenie in October — a statutory remedy concerning delay. In November, he lodged a skarga na bezczynność, a complaint about the authority’s failure to act, with the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Gliwice.
The voivode sought dismissal of the complaint, relying on Article 100d of the law on assistance to Ukrainian citizens. That provision suspended deadlines in the listed immigration procedures and excluded some remedies against inaction and excessive delay. The suspension did not prohibit authorities from issuing decisions, but it limited applicants’ ability to hold them accountable for delays.
The Polish court questioned whether this mechanism was compatible with EU law and referred questions to the CJEU. The European Court answered the question of EU-law interpretation; the Polish court must decide the applicant’s individual claims in accordance with that answer. Paragraphs 8–20 of the judgment.
The Court did not rule out exceptional circumstances. A sudden event may indeed make it temporarily impossible to meet deadlines. But force majeure — siła wyższa — must be substantiated. The state must demonstrate that the circumstances were abnormal and unforeseeable, that their consequences could not have been overcome despite the required efforts, and that the exceptions lasted only as long as necessary.
The Court distinguishes a sudden surge in applications from a gradual increase in workload. The former may create difficulties that cannot immediately be overcome. The latter requires the state to adapt its administration and increase its capacity to process applications.
The Polish court was also asked to consider whether less general measures had been explored: targeted adjustments to deadlines, prioritisation of certain cases or staggered application of the measure. An exceptional situation may justify a temporary exception, but the state must demonstrate why it was necessary and why it lasted so long. Paragraphs 31–45 of the judgment.
The assessment of the period after 2022 is particularly significant. The Court stated that the mass arrival of people from Ukraine after 31 December 2022 no longer appeared unforeseeable. It also questioned whether the prolonged extension of restrictions demonstrated the efforts required of the state. It expressly left verification of the circumstances to the Polish court. This is a strong argument against using the situation to justify delays for years, but not an unconditional finding that every delay after that date was unlawful. Paragraph 46 of the judgment.
The issue remains current. In the published consolidated text of the Polish law, Article 100d provides for suspended deadlines until 4 March 2027. The CJEU examined an earlier version of the same mechanism, lasting until 30 September 2025. The judgment therefore matters beyond the past: the question is how to apply the continuing restrictions consistently with the Court’s interpretation of EU law. The judgment itself does not remove Article 100d from Polish legislation. Article 100d, Dz.U. 2026 item 1293, page 39PL🌐 Translate.
What does this mean for someone waiting for a decision? If your application concerns studies, research, training or voluntary service covered by the directive and falls under Article 34’s guarantees, you can rely on C‑254/25 in a skarga na bezczynność. It provides grounds to seek scrutiny of the reasons for the delay and the state’s efforts to overcome the difficulties. A reference to “suspended deadlines” alone is not sufficient to deprive an applicant of judicial protection.
The Court did not introduce a new, uniform deadline for all foreign nationals. It interpreted existing rules: Article 34(1) requires a decision on a complete application as soon as possible and within 90 days at the latest. Article 34(3) permits that period to be suspended until the necessary additional information or documents have been received where the submitted material is incomplete. Paragraphs 21–28 of the judgment.
For Tu Żyjemy, this is an important victory for applicants’ rights. The legal question before the CJEU has been answered. The Polish court must now apply that interpretation to the individual case. The next important question is how the judgment will affect voivodeship offices and other complaints about administrative inaction.
Prepared using the full judgment in C‑254/25 of 12 November 2026, ECLI:EU:C:2026:979. Sources checked on 12 November 2026.